Commentators covering recent social movements, such as the Arab Spring, commonly claim that cell phones enable protests. Yet, existing empirical work does not conclusively support this contention: some studies nd that these technologies actually reduce collective action; many
Media coverage of recent social movements -the Arab Spring, the Green Movement in Iran, and the Occupy movements in the U.S. and Turkey -frequently asserts that communication technologies facilitate protests. Headlines proclaim that cell phones and social media "fuel protests in Iran, Bahrain, and Yemen" (ABC News ), "give Wall Street Protests a Global Reach" (Preston ) , and are "key to [Turkey's] 'Occupy Gezi' protests" (Dorsey ) .
Yet, social movements predate the Internet, cell phones, or even broadcast media. Fischer ( ) recounts widespread protests during (e.g., in Belgrade, Bonn, Chicago, Paris, Prague, Warsaw and many other cities); the di usion of sit-ins and demonstrations during the U.S. civil rights movement; and the revolutions of , which a ected many European and even some Latin American countries. He cites a recent comparison of the Arab Spring and the revolutions of in which Weyland ( , ) observes that "the revolutions spread just as fast as the MENA protests, long before / TV news, Twitter, and Facebook. " ese historical events suggest that our contemporary fascination with mobile phones and social media may overestimate the importance of these technologies. Fischer concludes, "we do not know how they have made mobilization and di usion di erent than in the television era, or in the telegraph era for that matter. "
We address this ongoing debate about whether and why these new technologies have a causal e ect on protest activity. Our theory illustrates the direct and indirect e ects of cell phone access on protest. First, cell phones have a direct e ect by reducing coordination costs for would-be demonstrators. Cell phones enable individuals to share information about where or when a protest will occur (Little ) . Second, the expansion of cell phone networks has an indirect e ect that also increases the likelihood of protest. Where a large proportion of citizens have cell phones, the government fears that the mass public will learn of, and may be enraged by, repression. Fearing that repression could spark escalation, the government may so en its response. As the expected level of repression falls, protesting becomes less costly and, thus, more likely. In the recent pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, police were caught on video beating an activist. Leung ( ) writes that "For the neutrals, this episode could well be the tipping point. . . [A] er such a brutal beating -which we know happens all the time behind closed doors . . . but just never in public -it's become harder for many to just sit on the fence. Indeed, more people are back out on the streets. . . and angrier than ever. " By documenting and digitally sharing evidence of police brutality, protesters translated outrage over repression into additional support.
We provide evidence for these mechanisms using a quasi-experimental, di erence-in-di erences design that exploits high-resolution global data on the expansion of cell phone networks and the incidence of protest from -. In short, we nd ( ) that gaining coverage increases the probability of protest by over half the mean, ( ) that this e ect is larger where a greater share of a country's population is connected to the network, and ( ) that gaining coverage reduces the likelihood of repression. e last two ndings suggest that cell phones not only enable coordination (the direct e ect), but also temper the government's response by raising the visibility of repression (the indirect e ect). Finally, we nd that the rst e ect is driven by democratic countries or those with media freedom, suggesting that cellphone coverage has a larger e ect where citizens are otherwise free to criticize or organize against government.
To alleviate concerns about selection bias, we perform placebo tests to ensure that di erential trends prior to the extension of coverage do not explain our ndings. We also include a time-varying measure of economic development in our models to demonstrate that our results are not driven by concomitant changes in economic activity. We show that our main result holds across event datasets that employ di erent methods for coding and geo-locating protests. Finally, we nd no evidence of reporting bias in areas receiving cell phone coverage, and a bounding exercise suggests that any reporting bias would have to be large to explain away our main e ects.
Our di erence-in-di erences design improves on past empirical work. Several past studies focus on already extant social movements where cell phones or social media are suspected to have catalyzed protests (e.g., Howard et al.
; Khamis and Vaughn ; Caren and Gaby ) . While these studies are rich in detail, by selecting on the dependent variable, they can not rule out the possibility that these technologies have no e ect -that there are contexts with comparable cell phone penetration that have seen no change in protest activity. Other studies rely on cross-sectional comparisons (e.g., Pierskalla and Hollenbach , present primary results based on cross-sectional data). Such studies struggle to account for static di erences across localities that do and do not receive coverage that may also a ect the incidence of protest, such as, distance from the capital or ethnic composition. By contrast, our identi cation strategy exploits within-locality variation in cell phone access and protest, which eliminates confounds that do not vary within localities over our eight-year study period. Recent work by Manacorda and Tesei ( ) employs a similar identi cation strategy and concurs with our ndings, but restricts attention to economically motivated protests in African countries.
While cell phones do not inspire political revolutions, we do nd that these technologies enable mobilization by directly and indirectly reducing the costs of protesting.
. Extant Work on the Coordination and Containment of Protest
Would-be protesters face formidable challenges. Protesting imposes private costs on participants: they have to gather information about the event, take time away from work or leisure, and risk being repressed. Even if an individual cares about a cause, he or she may only be willing to bear these costs if they are con dent that others will join them. As a protest increases in size, its probability of success may grow, and each individual's likelihood of being targeted for repression declines (Kuran , p. ) . us, the individual returns to protesting increase with the number of other individuals that participate. is type of strategic problem is commonly referred to as a coordination problem (Chwe , p. ) .
How do individuals solve these coordination problems? Consider the problem from the perspective of a single individual. A potential protester wants her compatriots to know that she is is is distinct from a free-rider problem. Although some past work asserts that cell phones help groups sanction free-riders, we focus on coordination problems, because of the many case studies illustrating how cell phones help individuals communicate about protest (see Kelly Garrett ) .
planning to protest. Knowing this, they may also want to participate, as their returns to protesting are higher if the original protester turns out. But before following through with her stated plan, she needs to know that her compatriots have heard her, and, furthermore, they need to know that she knows that they have heard her plans, and so on. at is, the potential protester's plan needs to be common knowledge (Aumann ) . Several scholars have clari ed the important role that public rituals and organized religion can play in the development of common knowledge (Chwe ; Patel ) . We focus here on the role of communication technologies, such as cell phones, in generating common knowledge or almost common knowledge.
First, in order for the potential protester to transmit her plan to take to the streets, she needs to be able to communicate with her compatriots. Better still, they should be able to communicate back and con rm that they heard her message. e ability to (reliably) transmit messages is then a necessary, if not su cient, condition for generating common knowledge about would-be protesters'
intentions. (If protesters prefer to share their intentions shortly before protesting to avoid preemptive arrests, then it also helps if they can communicate quickly.) Second, social media, which is increasingly accessed through mobile phones, provides a platform for users to share information about protests and know that others have seen their posts (e.g., think of the Like button on Facebook). Tufekci and Wilson ( , p. ) report that, in their sample of Egyptian protesters, just over percent used their phones to communicate about the protests, roughly percent used Facebook, and another percent used Twitter. And this use of social media appears to have increased
True common knowledge (with all of the implied higher order beliefs) rarely, if ever, exists in reality.
We focus instead on almost common knowledge, a concept developed in Rubinstein ( ).
Cell phones are not the only technology that can serve this function: centralized mass media, such as radio and television, can aid in coordination; however, these outlets can also be captured by the state (e.g., Kern and Hainmueller ; Warren ; Yanagizawa-Drott ).
As of the Q , Facebook announced that % of its ad revenues were generated through mobile, and % of users only access the site from their phones (Hamburger ) . 
. Coordination of Protests, Repression, and Escalation
Our argument synthesizes and extends this prior work by considering how new communication technologies a ect the decisions of protesters, governments, and citizens. We formalize the argument in section A, but focus here on the intuition.
When deciding whether to stage a protest, individuals consider the costs, which are a ected by others' participation and the risk of repression. Each potential protester cares about what others do, because there is strength and protection in numbers. e government, unwilling or unable to immediately concede to the protesters' demands, can choose to repress. Repression imposes a cost on protesters, but it can also outrage citizens, bringing more people out into the streets, escalating the demonstration. e case studies and survey evidence cited above suggest that witnessing repressive acts can invokes sympathy and support for protesters. e government must then weigh the deterrent e ect of repression against the risk of escalation.
We argue that cell phones enable collective action when groups want to mobilize. First, cell phones reduce the costs of coordination. Where potential protesters can quickly exchange information about where or when a demonstration will be staged, they reduce uncertainty about how to participate. is reduces the costs of turning out and, thus, increases the probability of protest -
the direct e ect.
Second, where the cell network is extensive, gaining coverage connects a community to a large proportion of their fellow citizens. If a protest occurs in this newly covered community, information about any government response can now be widely broadcast. We argue that some (though not all)
citizens sympathize with protesters and punish the government if they witness harsh repression.
Anticipating this backlash, the government exercises greater restraint should a protest occur the newly covered community. is reduces protesters' expected costs of repression and, thus, further increases the probability of protest -the indirect e ect. Hence, the e ect of gaining coverage on the occurrence of protest should be greater where a large proportion of citizens are connected to the cell phone network, i.e., where a bigger audience bears witness to any repression. ( ese comparative statics are stated more formally in proposition , in section A. of the appendix.)
We take these two predictions to the data:
(H ) Gaining access to cell phone networks increases the probability of protest.
(H ) is e ect on the probability of protest is larger when a greater share of the population already has access to the cell phone network.
We also look for evidence that cell phone access reduces the probability of repression. Our prediction is that cell phones should reduce the use of repression, though this is a more di cult claim to evaluate given sample selection concerns discussed in section C of the appendix.
In the conjectured equilibrium, repression and the resulting backlash are o the equilibrium path.
While bystanders will not be provoked to join the demonstration, the initial group of protesters faces lower costs to mobilizing when there is no risk of repression.
. Empirical Strategy . Estimating the E ect of Coverage on Protest
To evaluate the rst hypothesis, we look for changes in the probability of protest a er an area receives access to a cell phone network and compare these changes to trends in localities that remain outside of the network. Concretely, we estimate the di erence-in-di erences between areas that receive coverage during our study period and those that do not, using the following speci cation:
where i indexes a locality, t indexes years, D it is an indicator variable for whether a locality is covered in year t, and X it is a matrix of time-varying covariates. α i and β t are locality and year-speci c intercepts. Our dependent variable, y it , is an indicator for whether area i had a protest in year t. If gaining access to cell phone networks increases the probability of protest, then γ should be positive, indicating that the likelihood of protest increases by a larger magnitude a er localities receive coverage relative to the change observed in uncovered areas.
Our second prediction is that gaining access to a cell phone network should have a larger e ect on the probability of protest when the proportion of citizens already connected to the network (which we denote as m ct ) is large. In short, if an area is suddenly able to communicate with most of the country due to its inclusion in the communication network, we expect that access to the network will have a larger impact on protest activity. To estimate this heterogeneous e ect, we amend equation slightly:
where m ct is the proportion of people in i's country c that are covered in time t. e second hypothesis implies that η should be positive. In estimating all of these models, we cluster our standard errors at the locality level unless otherwise noted.
Our empirical strategy does not assume the as-if random assignment of cell phone coverage.
Any static di erences across areas that do and do not receive coverage will not confound our analysis. We agree that whether, for example, a cell falls within the boundaries of the capital city, or whether it experienced a history of armed con ict or repression could a ect both the likelihood of protest and cell phone coverage. However, our cell xed e ects account for these and all other features, which do not vary over our eight-year time window.
We make less restrictive assumptions to obtain consistent estimates of γ. To recover the causal e ect (technically, the average treatment e ect on the treated) of cell phone coverage, we need ( ) areas that do and do not receive treatment to follow parallel trends in the absence of treatment, and ( ) that coverage expansion into one area does not a ect protest or repression in other areas.
e parallel-trends assumption would be violated by omitted, time-varying characteristics that are correlated with cell phone coverage and a ect protest incidence. While this assumption is untestable, it is commonly bolstered by demonstrating that treatment and control areas follow similar trends prior to treatment. First, we show that the increase in protest does not anticipate our treatment ( gure ). is suggests that the areas that receive coverage are not undergoing changes (e.g., urbanization) immediately prior to coverage that also make them more inclined to protest.
Second, a falsi cation test that assigns treatment well before it actually occurs also reveals no differential trends prior to the extension of coverage. ird, we include country×year xed e ects in selected models, i.e., exible, country-speci c time trends. ese terms absorb any features that vary at the country-year level (e.g., regime or economic downturns). Finally, we also include a time-varying measure of economic development, nighttime luminosity, to address concerns about modernization driving both the expansion of coverage and protest.
More technically, we require that E(ε it |D it , α i , β t ) = 0. Consistent estimates of η additionally require the conditional exogeneity of the proportion of citizens with coverage,
We address concerns about non-constant treatment e ects and violations of SUTVA through the speci c functional form in equation . is speci cation allows for both the heterogeneous treatment e ects and the spillover suggested by our model.
. Estimating the E ect on Repression
Finally, if cell phones expand the number of citizens that witness repression and, thus, discourage authorities from clashing with demonstrators, then the frequency of repression should decline as areas transition into cell phone coverage. We estimate:
where r it is an indicator for repression in locality i in year t. Even granting the standard di erencein-di erences assumptions above, estimating the e ect of coverage on repression remains challenging. is is because repression is only observed when a protest actually takes place and not when a protest that would have been repressed never materializes (i.e., when repression e ectively deters protest). If we could somehow observe every instance where repression would have been employed whether or not a protest took place, we expect that τ < 0.
Fortunately, our theoretical model allows us to make empirical progress, as it predicts, for di erent parameter values, how cell coverage a ects the use of repression and when that is observable. Assuming our model is correct, we show in section C of the appendix that our estimate of τ will understate the true reduction in repression if we exclude localities where the costs of staging a protest are prohibitively high. To remove such places, we drop localities that never experience a protest before their rst year of cell coverage. Estimating equation using the resulting sample, we feel more con dent about interpreting our estimate of τ as an attenuated estimate of the negative e ect of coverage on repression; nonetheless, these results should be regarded cautiously.
.
Data . Cell Phone Coverage
To measure cell phone coverage over time, we rely on the Collins Mobile Coverage Explorer database, which is based on submissions made by telecom operators around the world. e data has a nominal resolution of approximately km on the ground, and is available yearly for the period -, except for . Pierskalla and Hollenbach ( ) employ data from the same source, albeit for a shorter time span and only for African countries.
As gure shows, cell phone coverage increased substantially during the -period, though larger urban areas and developed countries already had (near) complete coverage prior to . In the empirical analysis, we leverage variation from the areas that undergo a change in their coverage status during the period of study (marked in black) and exclude areas that are covered throughout the entire study period. In section D. , we compare the proportion of the population Our maps show coverage areas in quarter (Q ) of , Q , Q , Q , Q , Q
. We use the , , and maps to code treatment in those years. However, for the , , and data, we use these maps to code treatment in the following year. at is, if an area has coverage in the last quarter of , we code it as treated from forward. is decision avoids coding areas as treated before they actually receive coverage. However, it comes at the cost of coding some areas as control when they had access to the cell network for part of the year. If cell phones increase protest incidence, this coding decision should make it harder to nd such an e ect.
e coverage data includes GSM ( G), G and G mobile standards. Some countries -notably the US -phased in GSM from CDMA/IS-. For these areas, we could incorrectly assign a change in treatment, when the data simply re ects a change in standards. is problem a ects very few countries: in Africa, for example, GSM accounted for % of market share by (Selian ) .
Given that our results hold in a sample of African countries and when we exclude (the year of concern), we feel con dent that changes in mobile standards do not drive our ndings. Our analysis Our geographic unit is the km 2 grid cell (at the equator). We discuss this aggregation decision below, which is motivated by our recognition that protest events are o en geo-coded using cities or towns, which can span multiple km 2 cells. We code units as treated if at least half of their area is covered in a given year. Alternatively, we can code units as treated if any of it is covered; this is also robust to removing any country from the sample. decision does not a ect our results.
. Protest Events
Global Database of Events, Location, and Tone e Global Database of Events, Location, and Tone (GDELT) uses tools from text analysis to machine code events from a wide array of news sources (Leetaru and Schrodt ) . GDELT includes a number of di erent types of events, but we only extract the protests which occurred between and August and can be geo-located based on the name of speci c city or landmark.
at is, we only retain protest events with the most precise geo-codes.
GDELT errs on the side of inclusion and, thus, contains more false positives than other event databases. However, we do not believe this introduces any bias into our analysis. First, we show that our results hold using the Social Con ict in Africa Database, which is hand-coded. Second, our empirical strategy leverages trends -not level di erences -in protest activity, and head-to-head comparisons suggest that GDELT captures important changes in protest activity (Steinart-relkeld ICEWS, a warning system used by the US government. ey nd that "the volume of GDELT data is very much larger than the corresponding ICEWS data, but they both pick up the same basic protests in Egypt and Turkey, and the same ghting in Syria" (p. ). Finally, we include both locality and year (or country-year) xed e ects in our models. ese absorb any time-invariant variation in protest levels at the grid cell level (e.g., due to geography), as well as global trends in protest incidence (e.g., due to changes in the corpus of news sources used to code GDELT events).
Protest events are typically assigned coordinates based on the town or city that they occur in.
We construct grid cells that are × kilometers in dimension, as this corresponds to the median area of major towns or cities according to Oak Ridge National Laboratory ( ). Our results are GDELT avoids double-counting by aggregating stories covering the same event. While work by Manacorda and Tesei ( ) uses logged counts from the GDELT data, we employ a binary indicator for protest as the dependent variable to limit concerns about over-counting.
robust to di erent cell sizes: our estimates are of the same magnitude (relative to the sample mean)
if we use smaller ( km 2 ) or larger ( km 2 ) grid cells. In section D. , we restrict attention to major cities and nd support for our hypotheses using the city-year as the unit of analysis.
Social Con ict in Africa Database
We also use event data on protests, riots, and strikes from the Social Con ict in Africa Database (SCAD) (Hendrix and Salehyan ) . e SCAD is culled from Associated Press and Agence France
Presse news wire stories for African countries ( -). A pool of stories that contain key words associated with mobilization or violence are sorted, read, and hand-coded. Events only enter the data one time, but multiple locations (e.g., a simultaneous protest across di erent cities) receive separate entries with distinct coordinates. e SCAD excludes all events that take place within the context of an armed civil con ict (as de ned by the start and end dates in the Uppsala Armed Conict Database). As with GDELT, we only use those protests with precise geo-codings.
e SCAD is especially useful for our purposes, because it includes an indicator for whether the event was repressed. We use this variable to assess whether cell phone coverage reduces the probability of repression.
Integrated Crisis Early Warning System
Finally, we corroborate our results with the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS), produced by Lockheed Martin, which draws on commercially available news sources from approximately publishers, including both international and national publishers (Boschee et al. ) .
Like GDELT, ICEWS machine codes events using the Con ict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) system, which includes a top-level category for protest (Schrodt and Yilmaz ) . e dataset covers all countries over the period from to . We restrict our sample to more precisely geo-located events that include the name of a speci c city or town. An evaluation by human
We recognize that the geo-coding procedure may amplify protest counts in some cells (e.g., the centroids of towns). Such level-di erences across cells will be absorbed by our xed e ects and, thus, not a ect our estimates. In appendix D. . , we show that cell coverage does not lead to a divergence in protest reports across the datasets, suggesting that cell coverage is not amplifying reporting bias in the GDELT data relative to other datasets.
Suppose that there are N grid cells in country c,
We employ the "Average Lights x Pct" measure, which assigns each cell a number from to , representing its luminosity multiplied by the percent frequency of light detection. .
Results

. Cell Coverage and the Probability of Protest
We evaluate our rst two hypotheses by estimating equations and using both the GDELT and SCAD. To recap, we expect that cell phone coverage increases the probability of protest and that this e ect will be largest where a large proportion of the citizenry is already a part of the network (i.e., where cell phones connect localities to a larger audience).
Before presenting the main estimates, we start by reporting the probability of protest for three groups in table : (a) areas that never receive coverage, (b) treated areas prior to treatment, and (c) treated areas a er they have gained access to the network. Among those areas that eventually receive coverage, the probability of protest is over twice as large a er they transition into coverage.
ese simple comparisons foreshadow our regression results. is table also highlights an important feature of the data: we are looking at the probability of protest in a given km 2 grid cell in a given year. Our sample has over two million populated grid cells, so that probability is small in absolute terms. In interpreting the magnitude of our e ects, it is important to keep in mind this low baseline probability. Two gures help convey our main results and the credbility of our empirical strategy. First, in the le panel of gure , we graph the trends in the probability of protest in both control and treatment grid cells. is gure shows that prior to transitioning into coverage, both groups follow roughly parallel trends; yet, a er receiving cell phone coverage, the probability of protest increases substantially more in treated grid cells relative to control areas. In the right panel of gure we estimate the change in the probability of protest in the years before and a er grid cells transition to coverage (relative to the areas that have not yet transitioned). To estimate this model, we include both leads and lags of our treatment variable in equation (See Autor , Fig. , for an early implementation of this strategy). is gure conveys two similar points. First, as with the simple di erence-in-di erences visualization, there is no evidence that the probability of protest was increasing prior to coverage in the grid cells that eventually receive treatment; nding no evidence of anticipation bolsters the identifying assumption that treatment and control areas would have followed parallel trends in the absence of treatment. Furthermore, the treatment e ect is not immediate, but rather increases with time. We do not expect the introduction of cell phone coverage to immediately incite protest; only a er citizens adopt the technology can it have the e ect of enabling collective action.
In table , we report the estimates from equations and . e rst two models estimate (b) Leads/Lags Plot e gure on the le plots the probability of protest in the years before and a er coverage.
e gure on the right displays the point estimates and % con dence intervals on four leads and lags of our treatment variable. We use protest information from -to construct the lead/lags to avoid losing observations. e nal lag is equal to for every year beginning with the fourth year a er coverage. e sample used is limited to grid cells that experience a change in treatment status.
the most straightforward di erence-in-di erences, only including an indicator for whether a grid cell has access to the cell phone network in a given year. e rst model includes grid cell and year xed e ects, while the second model substitutes the year xed e ects for country×year xed e ects, exibly accounting for country-speci c trends in the probability of protest. e di erencein-di erences estimate from model implies that the transition to coverage increases the probability of protest by roughly half the baseline probability in treated areas. Model demonstrates that this result is robust to including our proxy for economic development (logged luminosity, lagged one e e ect size grows for more densely populated areas (see section D. ). If we look, for example, at grid cells with more than , inhabitants -a population density of , inhabitants per km year), suggesting that the e ect is not driven by modernization that could both generate demand for coverage and protest. Our second hypothesis states that the e ect of cell phone coverage should be larger where access to the cell network connects a locality to a large proportion of their fellow citizens. We expect the interaction of our coverage indicator and the proportion of each country's population connected to the cell phone network (m ct ) to be positive. In both models and , we nd that the coe cient on the interaction term is both positive and signi cant. Our linear interaction term in model implies that the e ect of coverage on protest is positive when m ct exceeds . , which occurs around the th percentile of m ct for the covered cells in our sample (see gure A. for the distribution of m ct ).
We caution against reading too much into the implied e ect of coverage at very low-levels of m ct .
First, there are not many treated cells in this range. Second, when we look at the e ect of coverage on protest for cells that fall below the median level of m, we nd that the e ect is smaller but still positive. Figure A. reports the e ect of coverage for di erent terciles of m ct .
We also explore whether the e ect of cell phone access on protest is larger in states that limit political competition or e ectively censor mass media. In table A. of the appendix, we interact our treatment variable with indicators for whether a country is democratic (according to Polity IV) or allows the media to function freely. We nd that the positive e ect of cell phone coverage on protest is driven by more democratic states. is result permits a number of interpretations: in relatively closed countries, government may be able to shut down these communication networks; 
Cell FEs , , , 
Robust std. errors clustered on grid-cell.
Notes: columns -: linear probability model regressions, where the dependent variable has been multiplied by . See equations and for the econometric speci cations. e unit-of-analysis is the grid cell-year (grid cells measure x km at the equator). Grid cells with no population according to the LandScan data in are excluded from the sample, as are all grid cells covered throughout the study period. Data for the dependent variable comes from GDELT from -and -; only protests with precise geo-codes are used. Information on mobile coverage is taken from the Collins Mobile Coverage Explorer database. Luminosity data (lagged one year) comes from the Defense Meteorological Operational Linescan System. alternatively, repression may be already expected in these contexts and, thus, unlikely to incite additional anger and a backlash among bystanders. Finally, traditional media that can freely express criticism may further amplify information about government repression. Whatever the mechanism, cell phones have smaller direct and indirect e ects in these settings.
As a further check that trends in the treatment and control areas are parallel prior to the We also nd that the indirect e ect of cell phone coverage is larger in democracies (see table A. ). expansion of cell coverage, we conduct a falsi cation test. First, we re-assign treatment eight years before the actual extension of coverage, and then estimate the di erence-in-di erences using data on protest from -period. For example, a place that receives coverage in is assigned placebo coverage starting in . Under the parallel trends assumption, we expect no e ect of this placebo treatment on the probability of protest. e gure plots the probability of protest in the years before and a er a placebo treatment that occurs eight years prior to the actual treatment.
Using GDELT data, gure plots probability of protest in each year before and a er a placebo transition into coverage. e levels for the placebo treatment are di erent from the actual transition into cell phone coverage in gure , suggesting a general upward trend in the overall probability of protest over time. Crucially, while the actual treatment generates a substantial increase in the We exclude from this analysis to avoid wrongly coding areas as untreated when, in fact, they transitioned to coverage during but are rst reported as covered in Q .
probability of protest following coverage, the placebo does not.
e pattern revealed in the gure is con rmed in table , where we repeat our main analysis with the placebo treatment and estimate equations and . e point estimate of placebo coverage is precisely estimated and close to zero in all models. For instance, model , which includes countryyear xed e ects in addition to grid cell xed e ects, indicates that the the real estimated e ect is over een times larger than the placebo result. Estimating equation , we also nd no evidence that the placebo e ect varies with m; the coe cient in table , model is a precisely estimated zero. Dependent variable: In addition to this falsi cation test, we also perform a number of robustness checks. First, we replicate our analysis using the ICEWS data in appendix D. . . While ICEWS reports lower levels of protest, the percentage change we estimate for cells transitioning to coverage is comparable across the datasets. Second, to address potential spatial dependence, we cluster our standard errors on larger geographic units, such as km 2 grid cells (see section D. ); our inferences are unchanged. ird, we also estimate the overall e ect of coverage using the SCAD (see appendix D. . ). is demonstrates that our ndings are robust to using an alternative (hand-coded) measure of social con ict and shows that the results hold in African countries, where there are no concerns about changes in mobile standards (from CDMA to GSM) contaminating treatment assignment. Table A . reports results that con rm what we found using the GDELT data. (As a percentage of the baseline probability, these e ects we nd using the SCAD are actually larger.) Finally, the results are robust to changing the unit of observation to smaller ( km 2 ) or larger ( km 2 ) grid cells, as well as to using a sample of major cities (table D. ). In table A. , we also show that cell phones per capita are associated with a higher probability of protest and number of protests at the country level.
ese results line up with recent ndings from Manacorda and Tesei ( ), who show that cell coverage increases protest activity in Africa during economic recessions. However, our argument and analysis di er in several ways. First, we do not restrict attention to Africa (except when analyzing the SCAD data). e motivating anecdotes from Hong Kong, Iran, or Turkey suggest a more global relationship. Second, we employ a much ner unit of analysis; the PRIO grid cells they use are at least km 2 , roughly times larger than our units. Our cell xed e ects absorb timeinvariant characteristics for units roughly the size of a town; their cells, by contrast, are twice the size of the median US county. ird, given concerns about duplicate reporting in GDELT (which could be related to treatment), we employ a binary measure rather than relying on the reported counts. Finally, although the SCAD data indicates that roughly a quarter of all protests in Africa are repressed (Christensen ), they omit any discussion or analysis of repression.
. Cell Coverage and Repression
We nd that the e ect of cell phone access on the probability of protest is greater where gaining access to the network connects a locality to a larger proportion of the citizenry. is is consistent with our second mechanism: governments should be less inclined to repress a protest if they know that protesters can rapidly share images of police brutality with a large audience of their fellow citizens. Anticipating less repression, protesters are then more willing to demonstrate. In this section we look for more direct evidence that the use of repression declines in areas that have received coverage.
e analysis in this section requires a few additional caveats. First, we are limited to the SCAD, which only includes African countries (with populations over one million) and does not contain information on social con ict beyond . is lops o a large non-random chunk of our sample. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we only observe repression that occurs in response to protests. If no protest occurs in a grid cell-year, then (in this data) the government never has an opportunity to use repression, which induces the selection problem described in section . . By removing observations where no protest takes place in the recent past (between and or the year of treatment, whichever comes rst), we can obtain an estimate of a lower bound of the e ect of coverage on repression (see section C for the logic behind this subgroup analysis). at is, if our formal model correctly describes the e ect of cell phone coverage on repression decisions, our estimates understate the true reduction in repression. We start by presenting these results graphically in gure : while the probability of repression appears to follow parallel trends in treatment and control areas prior to the expansion of coverage, the likelihood of repression falls considerably in treated areas. is decrease is especially striking given the increasing probability of repression observed in uncovered areas. e results from equation are presented in table . Our di erence-in-di erences estimates suggest that the probability Dependent variable: e gure plots the probability of repression in the years before and a er coverage. e table includes linear probability models, as speci ed in equation . Data on repression comes from SCAD, and information on cell phone coverage is taken from the Collins Mobile Coverage Explorer database. Per section C, the sample is grid cells that experienced a protest between -or prior to treatment (whichever comes rst).
of repression is considerably lower a er grid cells gain access to a cell phone network. We regard these results as suggestive of the second mechanism highlighted by the model, though they are not statistically signi cant (t ≈ 1.3, for the rst two models). When we interact coverage with the proportion of the population covered by the network, the coe cient is negative, as expected, but also very imprecisely estimated.
. Cell Phone Coverage and Reporting Bias
One concern about the data underlying these results is that cell phones could enable journalists to learn about and report on protests. As a result, protests in areas with cell networks may
Including logged luminosity has no e ect on these point estimates.
receive more coverage and, thus, be more likely to appear in our event datasets, which are based on news reports. In a recent article, Weidmann ( , -) provides evidence that cell phone coverage increases the probability that international news outlets report armed con icts in Afghanistan.
We take a number of steps to ameliorate concerns that such reporting bias could drive the e ects we detect. Two features of our empirical design address potential reporting bias. First, unlike cross-sectional studies, we control for all features of grid cells that do not vary between and . We are not worried then about reporting biases that are driven by geography, distance to a major city or border, or the language spoken in a particular place. Second, we include a timevarying measure of development, luminosity. is addresses the concern that as areas develop, they are more likely to garner reporters' attention.
We go further and look at whether the average number of articles or sources reporting on protests increase when locations transition into cell phone coverage. at is, we run our same di erence-in-di erences (equation ) but use the average number of articles or sources per protest (from GDELT) as the dependent variable. Our estimates are negative and small relative to the mean.
ese results suggest that the intensity of media coverage did not meaningfully change when areas transitioned into cell phone coverage, providing more direct evidence that reporting bias is not in play. e number of observations drops in these regressions, as these only include cell-years that have protests. Finally, we pursue a bounding approach and nd that reporting bias would need to be large . Conclusion is paper addresses an ongoing debate about whether and why cell phones a ect protest activity around the world. We make two advances. e rst is theoretical: we present an argument for how cell phones both reduce coordination costs and deter repression. Our second contribution is empirical: we nd that gaining access to the cell phone network increases the probability of protest by more than half the baseline probability of protest. Furthermore, this e ect is larger in cases where a large proportion of citizens already have access to the network -a nding consistent with our argument that cell phones increase the risk of escalation and, thus, deter repression. We also nd suggestive evidence that the probability of repression declines a er an area gains access to the cell network, though these estimates are imprecise and plausibly a lower bound of the true e ect.
More broadly, we address questions about how citizens coordinate to assert their demands, and when such mobilization is tolerated or met with brutal repression. Cell phones are simply a technology -albeit an important one -that enables individuals to quickly disseminate information both about their political intentions and any government response. While nearly every country constitutionally recognizes citizens' rights to freely associate, many fewer honor this right in practice (Christensen and Weinstein ) . is paper provides a model, supported by empirical evidence, for thinking about when governments allow citizens to engage in public dissent -not because of the undeniable normative appeal of free association but because cracking down is counter-productive. 
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